How institutions and beliefs affect environmental discourse: Evidence from an eight-country survey on REDD+ by Di Gregorio, M et al.
This is a repository copy of How institutions and beliefs affect environmental discourse: 
Evidence from an eight-country survey on REDD+.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/117873/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Di Gregorio, M orcid.org/0000-0003-2545-217X, Gallemore, CT, Brockhaus, M et al. (2 
more authors) (2017) How institutions and beliefs affect environmental discourse: 
Evidence from an eight-country survey on REDD+. Global Environmental Change, 45. pp. 
133-150. ISSN 0959-3780 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.05.006
© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an author produced version of a paper published
in Global Environmental Change. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's 
self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
How Institutions and Beliefs affect Environmental Discourse: 
Evidence from an Eight-Country Survey on REDD+
Words 7,338 (including main body text, table and figure captions excluding references)
Monica Di Gregorio 1,2
Caleb Tyrell Gallemore 3
Maria Brockhaus 2,4
Leandra Fatorelli1
Efrian Muharrom2
1: University of Leeds, Sustainability Research Institute
2: Center for International Forestry Research
3: Lafayette College, International Affairs Program
4: University of Helsinki
Corresponding author:
Monica Di Gregorio
University of Leeds, School of Earth and Environment, Sustainability Research Institute, 
LS2 9JT, Leeds, United Kingdom
Phone: ++44 (0)113-343-1592
Fax:  ++44 (0)113 34 35 259
Email: m.digregorio@leeds.ac.uk
Co-Authors: 
Caleb Tyrell Gallemore 2,3
Caleb Tyrell Gallemore 
Lafayette College
International Affairs Program
730 High St
Easton, PA 18042, United States
Email: gallemoc@lafayette.edu
Maria Brockhaus 2,4
Published in Global Environmental Change as : Di Gregorio, M., Gallemore, C.T., Brockhaus, M., Fatorelli, L., Muharrom, E. 
(2017) How institutions and beliefs affect environmental discourse: Evidence from an eight-country survey on REDD+. Global 
Environmental Change, 45, 133-150. doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.05.006
Maria Brockhaus 
University of Helsinki
Department of Forest Sciences 
PO. Box 27, Latokartanonkaari 7, 00014, FINLAND
Email: maria.brockhaus@helsinki.fi
Leandra Fatorelli1
Leandra Fatorelli
University of Leeds, School of Earth and Environment, Sustainability Research Institute, 
LS2 9JT, Leeds, United Kingdom
Email: lfatorelli@gmail.com
Efrian Muharrom2
Efrian Muharrom
Center for International Forestry Research
Jl. Cifor, Situ Gede, 16115 Bogor, Indonesia
Email: eeprian@gmail.com
Acknowledgements 
This research is part of the policy component of the Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (http://www.cifor.org/gcs/). The 
methods applied here build partially on research undertaken by the Comparing Climate 
Change Policy Networks program (http://compon.org), led by Jeffrey Broadbent and funded 
by the National Science Foundation. The authors would like to express their deep gratitude to 
our partners and the individual country teams in the global comparative study, without those 
work in the research countries this comparative paper would not have been possible. In 
particular, we would like to thank Maria Fernanda Gebara, Peter May and Shaozeng Zhang 
(Brazil),  Felicien Kengoum (Cameroon), Moira Moeliono, Cynthia Maharani, Bimo 
Dwisatrio, Levania Santoso and Christine Wairata (Indonesia), Bryan Bushley, Dil Bahadur 
Khatri, and Naya Sharma Paudel (Nepal), Andrea Babon, Daniel McIntyre, Gae Y. Gowae 
(Papua New Guinea), Mary Menton, Javier Perla, Juan Sotes (Peru), Salla Rantala 
(Tanzania), Thuy Thu Pham and Dung N. Le (Vietnam). Funding for the study was provided 
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Australian Agency for 
International Development, the European Commission, the Department for International 
Development of the UK, and the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. We also 
would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. We wish to 
dedicate this work to the memory of Bryan Bushley, a colleague and friend whom we all 
sorely miss. 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the adoption of discourses on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation (REDD+) across different national contexts. It draws on institutional 
theories to develop and test a number of hypotheses on the role of shared beliefs and politico-
economic institutions in determining the discursive choices of policy actors.  The results 
show that win-win ecological modernization discourse, embraced by powerful government 
agencies and international actors, dominates national REDD+ policy arenas. This discourse is 
challenged primarily by a minority reformist civic environmentalist discourse put forward 
primarily by domestic NGOs. We find evidence that countries with a less democratic political 
system and large-scale primary sector investments facilitate the adoption of reconciliatory 
ecological modernization discourse, which may not directly challenge the drivers of 
deforestation. Policy actors who believe in and are engaged in market-based approaches to 
REDD+ are much more likely to adopt ecological modernization discourses, compared to 
policy actors who work on community development and livelihoods issues. 
Keywords: climate change discourse; institutions; policy beliefs; environmental governance; 
forest; mitigation
How Institutions and Beliefs affect Environmental Discourse: 
Evidence from an Eight-Country Survey on REDD+
1. Introduction
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) was first proposed in 
2005 as a way to link anti-deforestation and climate change mitigation efforts. While there have 
been numerous approaches to this basic idea, REDD+ can generally be seen as a financial 
mechanism aimed at directing results-based payments to areas undertaking forestry projects that 
reduce carbon emissions, particularly where these areas were previously subject to significant 
deforestation (Campbell, 2009). 
Studies analysing REDD+ have often asked whether the initiative has the potential to spark 
transformative policy changes to improve forest protection in tropical forest countries 
(Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012). A number of researchers studying REDD+ have investigated 
the formation of discourse coalitions with sufficient power to change business-as-usual, or, more 
broadly, status-quo, policies (den Besten et al., 2014; Di Gregorio et al., 2015; Vijge et al., 
2016). 
What we know less about, however, is how discursive practices are constrained and enabled by 
broader social contexts (Foucault, 1972). To address this gap, this paper investigates how 
institutions and belief systems affect environmental discourses on REDD+. Discourses about 
appropriate policy responses to environmental problems often form the backdrop for 
mobilization and activism around environmental concerns (Hajer, 1995). The studies cited in the 
previous paragraph, for example, document an absence of dominant reformist or radical 
discourse coalitions that could generate transformative, or fundamental, change in forest 
governance, but, because of limited attention to the interaction between broader structures and 
specific discourses on REDD+, we lack a systematic account of why such frames fail to emerge 
or spread widely. We argue that developing such an account requires a multilevel approach that 
integrates institutional path dependence at the national level and belief systems at the 
organizational level to explain patterns in the adoption of three broader environmental 
governance discourses (Arts and Buizer, 2009; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Di Gregorio, 
2012; Schmidt, 2008). These broader discourses, or meta-discourses, are the discourses of 
ecological modernization, civic environmentalism and green governmentality described by  
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006).
Belief systems, discourses, and institutions, often have been used in isolation as alternative 
explanations in accounts of policy change (Schmidt, 2008). However, these mechanisms are 
complementary and sometimes overlap (Bulkeley, 2000; Winkel et al., 2011). In formulating a 
discursive response to novel policy initiatives, such as REDD+, organizations draw on prevalent 
broad and overarching environmental meta-discourses (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006), 
selecting appropriate positions based on a combination of their own values and beliefs (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) and the broader institutional context (Arts and Buizer, 2009; Schmidt, 
2008). 
To test these claims, we assess whether political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
North, et al., 2009), combined with shared beliefs, help predict organizations adoption of meta-
discourses. More specifically we investigate: (1) whether and to what extent organizations rely 
on the three meta-discourses in forming micro-discourses on REDD+; (2) whether and how 
political institutions and politico-economic conditions affect organizations discursive 
orientation; and (3) how shared beliefs systems affect organizations discursive orientation.
We use a unique dataset based on a survey conducted with policy actors engaged in the national 
REDD+ policy domain in eight countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Tanzania, and Vietnam), carried out between 2010 and 2013 as part of the Global 
Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD) (Brockhaus and Di Gregorio, 2012). Our work 
builds on recent comparative analysis on climate change and forest mitigation that goes beyond 
case-study research to integrate evidence from multiple countries (Di Gregorio et al., 2015; 
Gallemore and Munroe, 2013; Gupta et al. 2013; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014; Minang et al., 
2014; Vijge et al., 2016). The paper develops a theoretical framework that uses cognitive and 
institutional factors to explain patterns of adoption of environmental meta-discourses. Further, 
the research provides new evidence about national-level REDD+ discursive practices, in the 
countries implementing these policies. 
We begin by presenting our theoretical framework, explaining how it applies to climate change 
and forests policy processes and deriving hypotheses connecting institutions and beliefs to 
discursive practices. This is followed by a discussion of our data collection and analytical 
methods. Utilizing survey responses we then model clusters of opinion statements with latent 
class regression to simultaneously identify meta-discourses representing different discursive 
orientations (or clusters) that subsume similar positions on REDD+ (micro-discourses). The 
model allows us to simultaneously assess the extent to which broad national-level institutions, 
and organizational beliefs explain the distribution of these meta-discourses across our eight 
REDD+ countries. We close by considering the implications of our findings for REDD+ policy 
and policy studies more broadly.
2. Theoretical framework
We draw on different neo-institutional traditions, from (boundedly) rational choice, to 
sociological and discursive institutionalism, to help us analyse the determinants and distribution 
of environmental meta-discourses in the climate and forests policy domain (Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand, 2006; Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Schmidt, 2008). We begin with New 
Institutional Economics, which suggests institutional path dependence is a key obstacle to policy 
change (North, 1990; Peters et al., 2005). On this account, institutions, understood as the rules 
of the game (North, 1990: 4), facilitate cooperation among boundedly rational individuals and 
are changed or maintained as a result of the relative bargaining power of different social groups 
(Williamson, 1975). More recent work in this tradition adds that values and beliefs also influence 
boundedly rational beings, in particular in policy domains where uncertainty is high (North, 
2005). Constructivist institutional theories go further, arguing that institutions are in fact 
produced by discourses (Hajer, 1995). In other words, on the constructivist account, institutions 
might be altered not only due to changes in bargaining power among actors, but also due to 
changes in meanings and beliefs. Because constructivist discursive approaches risk blurring 
action and structure, many studies address two-way interactions between discourse and 
institutions and suggest that analytically policy change should be assessed from both ideational 
and institutional perspectives (Hay, 2008; Phillips et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2008, 2010).  
While exhibiting considerable differences, these accounts all suggest policy transformations are a 
product of complex interactions between path-dependent institutions; agents wishing to utilize, 
co-opt, or transform existing institutional conditions; and discursive practices adopted in the 
advocacy process itself (Arts and Buizer, 2009; Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012). While these 
reciprocal connections are complex, the processes in question change at different rates (Padgett 
and Powell, 2012: 2-3), providing an opportunity for analytic leverage. Our primary process of 
interest - policy actors adoption of a discursive orientation vis-à-vis REDD+ - takes place at the 
organizational level. From the perspective of organizational leaders, it is always necessary to 
adapt as political circumstances and agendas change. Organizational leaders rarely successfully 
innovate their own discourses separate from broader debates on environmental policy 
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006). Instead, meta-discourses frame audiences interpretations of 
forest and climate issues, such that truly novel interventions may be misunderstood, actively 
repressed, or simply ignored (Foucault, 1972). While such broad discursive frames might not be 
entirely consonant with organizations values and beliefs, as long as they are somewhat 
compatible, there is an incentive to adopt such discourses in order to build coalitions for 
advocacy or implementation (Di Gregorio, 2012). The relative stability of meta-discourses at a 
global scale, in the short run, suggests that we should observe organisations positions on 
REDD+ (micro-discourses) to cluster around the three meta-discourses that have emerged from 
countless discursive acts over time.
REDD+ discursive practices are informed by actors values and beliefs (Bulkeley, 2000; Di 
Gregorio, 2012). While social learning might be expected to change beliefs at the organizational 
level over time, in the short term we can consider deep core beliefs - the broadest and most 
stable among the beliefs and policy core beliefs -  the normative commitments and 
understanding of causal linkages in a given policy subsystem - to be relatively fixed (Weible et 
al., 2009: 122). Policy core beliefs include priorities such as the importance of economic growth 
versus environmental protection, the appropriate division of authority between government and 
markets, and core value priorities of a subsystems such as the need to address inequalities and 
poverty or to facilitate growth in order to achieve sustainability (Sabatier, 1997). Secondary 
policy beliefs, such as deciding what position to take with regard to a novel policy issue like 
REDD+, tend to have a more rapid temporal pace as they are informed by more immediate 
strategic concerns as new issues arise on the organizations agenda (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). 
Organizational leaders discursive positions and beliefs are also necessarily constrained by 
institutional conditions (Arts and Buizer, 2009), including political institutional conditions at the 
national level, such as the degree of democratic control of the polity, and the broader political 
economic context, including factors like the political dominance of specific economic sectors in 
society. While over the long term dominant organizations discursive practices may become 
institutionalized (Hajer, 1995), these broad institutional factors may be taken as relatively fixed 
in the short term (North, 1990). That is to say, while there is certainly a complex range of factors 
affecting the adoption of meta-discourses, we can get leverage on the role of at least some of 
those factors, including political institutions and politico-economic conditions, and policy core 
beliefs, which are unlikely to be endogenous in the short term. Figure 1 summarizes the main 
elements of our model.
[FIGURE 1  here] 
Figure 1: Model of the theoretical framework 
Next, we discuss the each elements in more detail. First we discuss the three meta-discourses, 
and then the institutional and the belief-based factors that affect the adoption of meta-discourses.
2.1. Environmental meta-discourses on REDD+
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006: 50) contend that debates surrounding forest carbon projects are 
a microcosm of three broader meta-discourses regarding global environmental governance: 
ecological modernization, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism. Ecological 
modernization is a win-win narrative, in which economic growth and environmental protection 
are either already mutually consistent or can readily be reconciled with simple institutional 
changes. Weak forms of ecological modernization focus on technological solutions and modest 
governance reforms, while strong forms entail broader changes in institutions and economic 
structures, favouring open and democratic decision-making (Christoff, 1996). Green 
governmentality discourses, on the other hand, are focused heavily on the techno-scientific 
management of individuals and nonhuman systems, situating the state and scientific and policy 
experts in positions of considerable authority. Some versions feature more elitist, globalizing and 
top-down visions, while others admit reflexive approaches (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004). Civic 
environmentalism, finally, also has two poles. A reformist version calls for excluded and 
disenfranchised groups to be active participants in environmental projects, while more radical 
adherents contend the extant global order is inherently inequitable and unsustainable, 
necessitating dramatic transformation.
Very similar positions are articulated in global REDD+ debates. Early proponents of REDD+, 
for example, often adopted ecological modernisations win-win outlook, contending that REDD+ 
would be big, quick, and cheap (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012: 33; Di Gregorio et al., 2015; 
den Besten et al., 2014; McDermott et al., 2011). Over time, however, advocates raised civic 
environmentalism critiques of REDD+, fearing for the rights and livelihoods of forest-dwelling 
peoples (Gupta, 2012). Technically sophisticated commentators participated in these debates, as 
well,  pointing out difficulties with measurement, monitoring, and verification of emissions as 
they echoed green governmentality themes (De Sy, et al., 2012; Gupta, et al., 2012).  
Previous research has documented some similarities and differences in dominant REDD+ 
discourses across countries. There is, for example, a general tendency to consider broad co-
benefits compared to just emission reduction aims, to recognize the role of community, as 
opposed to expert-based monitoring, and to privilege market, as compared to fund-based 
approaches, and there are also differences of opinion on whether national or subnational REDD+ 
accounting approaches should be pursued (Vijge et al., 2016). Each of these conflicting positions 
can be subsumed under one of the three meta-discourses identified by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 
(2006). Consequently, REDD+ micro-discourses might cluster under ecological modernization, 
green governmentality, of civic environmentalism discourses. The next step is to explain the 
institutional and belief-based determinants of these discursive orientations. 
2.2. Institutional context and discursive practices
Formal and informal institutions have tangible effects, establishing certain practices as legitimate 
or illegitimate, affecting who has the right to speak in what capacity, and grounding relationships 
of power and resource access (Lukes, 2005). Political institutions, such as the type of political 
regime and other politico-economic factors, such as the evolution of the constellation of power in 
key economic sectors, constrain agents actions, including their discursive strategies (Phillips, et 
al., 2004; Schmidt, 2008). This presents a problem: institutional path-dependence can constrain 
the formation of reformist discursive orientations necessary for the transformational change 
required to address the drivers of forest loss (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014).
We would expect variations in political institutions and politico-economic context to 
systematically favour or constrain certain discursive practices. Countries with more democratic 
political systems, all else equal, provide more space for civil society, making it safer to adopt 
reformist or even radical discourses (McAdam et al., 1996). Conversely, in authoritarian 
regimes, where dissident political discourses are suppressed (Wedeen, 1999), we would expect to 
observe civic environmentalism perspectives less often. This leads up to our first hypothesis:
H1: Organizations in countries with greater democratic control will be more likely to adopt civic 
environmentalism discourses.
Politico-economic conditions that grant power to particular vested interests are also likely to 
impact the adoption of discourses. The strength of status-quo interests - that is, groups whose 
interests might be negatively affected by changes required to bring about transitions to 
sustainability - is critical (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012). Countries in which status-quo 
interests are stronger will be likely to exhibit more win-win discourses, which are more 
amenable to business-as-usual arguments opposing significant - or sometimes any - changes. In 
the case of REDD+, we would expect that in countries where large-scale forestry and agricultural 
interests are particularly powerful, organizations would be more likely to adopt weak ecological 
modernization discourses, more amenable to the interests of this powerful sector, compared to 
civic environmentalism. Thus, our second hypothesis reads: 
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H2: Countries where large-scale primary sector interests are strong will exhibit higher rates of 
ecological modernization discourse. 
2.3. Beliefs and discursive practices
At the organizational level, cognitive approaches like Sabatiers (1988) Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) suggest that shared belief systems, in particular policy core beliefs, are the 
basis of coalition formation. Constructivist discursive approaches, such as Hajers (1995) 
discourse coalition framework, instead, contend discursive practices perform the same role. 
Traditionally, these two approaches have been considered alternative explanations of policy 
change. However, both accounts revolve around the importance of ideas (Winkel et al., 2011). In 
fact, the systems of beliefs of the ACF, and their related underlying values, tend to be formulated 
as meanings of discourse. In other words, discourses express, reproduce, or enact belief systems 
(Van Dijk, 2006). 
While discourses tend to be very broad and can be used strategically to seek instrumental 
alliances, people's core policy beliefs are more distinct, and are likely to be reflected in their key 
activities. For example, an organization that works on community development projects should 
value poverty alleviation as a key policy core belief.  We therefore rely on specific organizations 
level of engagement in certain activities as a proxy indicator of policy core beliefs. In the case of 
REDD+, market-based approaches, community livelihoods development, and technical policy 
development and performance monitoring have become particularly politically important. In turn 
the policy core beliefs associated with these activities map onto different meta-discourses. 
Activities linked to carbon measurement and trading and implementation of REDD+ schemes are 
11
closely aligned with win-win market-based environmental approaches (Dixon and Challies, 
2015; Gallemore et al., 2015; Winkel, et al., 2011). Consequently, we argue that: 
H3: Organizations specializing in carbon markets will be more likely to adopt ecological 
modernization discourses. 
This same logic holds for organizations engaged in community livelihoods development. In the 
REDD+ context, this generally means being involved in sustainable livelihoods activities and 
community rights advocacy. These reflect more reformist and sometimes even transformative 
policy core beliefs that aim at changing underlying conditions driving environmental damage. In 
contrast to those of organizations engaged in carbon trading and markets:
H4: Organizations specializing in community livelihoods development will be more likely to 
adopt civic environmentalism discourses. 
Finally, as noted above, there has been a significant demand for scientific research in support of 
REDD+, particularly to develop effective techniques to estimate carbon stocks and to assess 
mitigation reductions resulting from avoided deforestation (Romijn et al., 2012). Due to the 
scientific and technical focus of these activities we would expect that:
H5: Organizations engaged in research and policy design will be more likely to adopt green 
governmentality discourses.
Figure 2 summarizes the hypotheses and relationships between variables described above. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2: Operationalization of the model
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3. Methods 
The primary data for this study was derived from a multi-country study on national REDD+ 
policy processes. While this survey was designed primarily to assess organizations positions on 
REDD+ for the purposes of applied policy process analysis, it also provides a unique opportunity 
to study the determinants and distribution of discursive orientations in an emerging 
environmental policy arena. We used data from eight countries considered early starters on 
REDD+ (Angelsen et al., 2012; Arts et al., 2013): Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, 
Nepal, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam. For all countries, we utilized data on organizations 
engaged in REDD+ policy at the national level, and, in the case of Indonesia, additionally used 
data on those active in the province of Central Kalimantan, which was designated by the national 
government to pilot jurisdictional REDD+, putting it on the forefront of national REDD+ policy 
development. We replicated our model estimations without these provincial actors as a 
robustness check (Tables B.2 and B.3).
Data were collected using a standardized collection method for all countries based on an in-
person survey administered in the national language or English, based on respondents 
preferences. Organizations engaged in REDD+ policy were identified based on country teams 
knowledge and media searches, which involved collecting articles mentioning REDD+ from 
three to five of the largest circulation newspapers in each country over a 2005-2010, noting 
organizations and individuals mentioned as policy actors on REDD+ or directly quoted in each 
article. Once a list was compiled, a panel of five to ten experts from government, civil society, 
academia, and/or the private sector in each country or province reviewed the list, identifying 
organizations actively engaged in REDD+ policy processes, suggesting additional relevant and 
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deleting non-relevant organizations. High-level representatives of these organizations were 
invited to participate in the organizational survey. Potential interviewees were briefed on the 
purpose of the study, which was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of framing and policy 
networking engaged in REDD+ across multiple countries. Upon receiving informed consent 
from the organizations representative, surveys were administered in person by one or more 
interviewers. Interviews were recorded and transcribed if the interviewee granted permission, 
and all fixed-response survey data were recorded by the interviewers in a common database. 
Transcripts from interviews were consulted to provide context for the clusters estimated below. 
Our primary outcome variable in the study discussed here comes from 35 statements gauging 
organizations framing of REDD+. Respondents were asked to rate each of these opinion 
statements on a five-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. For 
modelling purposes, we dichotomized these scales, assigning a 1 to Agree or Strongly Agree 
and 0 otherwise. Our modelling objective was to assign organizations into clusters based on the 
pattern of their agreement with these stances. 
3.1 Modelling the determinants of meta-discourses on climate and forests
While there is certainly a reciprocal relationship between organizations discursive practices and 
broader politico-economic institutions (Schön and Rein, 1994; Benford and Snow, 2000), the 
models estimated in this paper focuses on how institutions and belief systems affect 
organizations discursive practices. While these practices, in turn, reshape institutions and beliefs 
systems, they do so on longer timescales than could be captured in a single cross-sectional study. 
Therefore, in this particular analysis we do not explicitly consider how organizations discourses 
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about REDD+ could in turn affect fundamental institutional contexts or global meta-discourses 
on the environment like those studied here. In effect, we apply an analytical dualism (Archer 
1996), treating agents and structures as distinct, a technique we consider justified due to the 
difference in timescales upon which structures and our phenomena of interest - organizations 
discursive and collaboration strategies - evolve.
To identify clusters in organizations stances on REDD+ across countries, we utilized latent class 
regression, as implemented in the poLCA Package in R (Linzer and Lewis, 2011; R Core Team, 
2015). Latent Class Regression has been used previously in literature on land-use decision-
making (Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013) and has a long tradition in public opinion research 
(McCutcheon, 1985). Here, we adopted it to group organizations into clusters of different 
stances, based on their representatives responses to opinion statements regarding REDD+. 
Simultaneously, we modelled factors explaining which organizations fall into each classification 
using a set of variables designed to proxy beliefs and values through organizational 
characteristics, as well as the political and politico-economic institutional context.
Latent class regression is an extension of latent class analysis, which classifies observations into 
a predetermined number of clusters based on the value of categorical variables. The model 
simultaneously estimates the clusters and a multinomial logistic regression that can be used to 
relate explanatory variables to resulting clusters, helping avoid biased coefficients. The resulting 
model estimates provide information about both the classes into which observations fall and the 
relationship between independent variables and observations classifications.
Latent class models are a type of finite mixture model, in which outcome variables are modelled 
as the result of a combination of distinct probability distributions. As Linzer (2011: 175) explains 
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the approach, we can think of a population as consisting of different types of individuals, or, in 
our case, organizations, whose attitudes might be similar within classes and different between 
them. The model identifies these classifications by estimating the probability that an individual 
in a given class responds to an item in a particular way. 
The fit of latent cluster regression models is generally evaluated by Akaike Information Criteria, 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), or Pearsons Chi-squared tests (Linzer and Lewis, 2011). In 
our case, we utilized BIC to select the appropriate number of classes because it allows us to 
balance model fit and parsimony. Further, we assessed our best models predictive adequacy 
using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves (Bradley, 1997), which measure 
prediction success by the area under a curve created by plotting false positives against false 
negatives for different cutoff values of predicted probability. The measure ranges from 0 to 1, 
with 1 indicating perfect prediction. As the measure is designed for binary classification, we 
plotted and computed the area under separate ROC curves for each cluster identified by the 
model. In addition, because we expect discourses to lead to consistent responses across opinion 
statements, and to ensure our findings are robust, we fitted our models on a random subset of 20 
of the 35 stances used from the survey, reserving 15 for cross-validation (see Appendix A Table 
A.1 for the complete description of the stances). This approach provides additional information 
on the validity of the resulting clusters by allowing us to see if the clusters of organizations 
identified by our models are also statistically significantly different on any opinion items that 
were not directly modelled.
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3.2. Latent class regression variables and data
Our hypothesis regarding the political institutional context focuses on democratic control of the 
political system. To measure democratic control, we used Polity IV democracy scores (Marshall, 
et al., 2014). A common measure of democratic governance, the Polity IV index ranges from -10 
(autocracy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). For each country in our sample, we computed the 
mean score between 2008 and 2012, the primary years of REDD+ activity around the time our 
survey was administered (Democracy). As indicators of politico-economic conditions and status-
quo interests we utilized data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (2017) on average 
gross fixed capital formation in the non-mining primary sector (that is, forestry, agriculture, and 
fishing) between 2008 and 2012. To normalize this variable, we calculate it as the number of 
US$ per US$1,000 of gross domestic product, in constant 2005 dollars and scale it in standard 
deviations for ease of model interpretation (Primary Capital).  
Core policy beliefs were proxied through key organizational activities. To identify organizations 
that support market-based policy approaches we considered whether they were considerably 
engaged in carbon measurement or trading activities. We computed the proportion of times a 
respondent organization reported expending much or very much effort on REDD-related 
carbon trading/brokerage and Implementation of REDD site activities (including 
demonstration sites activities, e.g. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD 
initiatives) (Market). We identified organizations engaged in community livelihoods 
development using the same technique, based on reported efforts on Tenure rights (land, trees), 
Poverty alleviation and equity (including distribution of REDD revenues), and Community-
based or joint forest management (Community). Finally, we operationalized research and policy 
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design activities using the same technique again, this time using reported efforts on Design of 
national level REDD strategies and policies, Design of sub-national level REDD strategies and 
policies, and REDD scientific research (Policy & Research). 
At the national level, we controlled for overall economic development using the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita in constant US$2011, by purchasing power parity (ln GDP Per 
Capita), taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015) and averaged from 
2008 to 2012. In addition, to control for unmeasured variation in institutional conditions, we 
estimated models with and without organizational type and country fixed effects. At the 
organizational level, we grouped policy actors into six categories by type. The first, Government, 
includes all domestic government agencies, at the national or subnational level. Academic, our 
second classification, includes national research institutes, think tanks, and universities. 
Domestic NGOs include NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) headquartered in the 
country for which they were surveyed, and form our third class. This class also includes any rural 
or indigenous organizations active in national REDD+ policy arenas. Private Sector 
organizations, which include firms, trade associations, and consultants, make up our fourth 
group. Our fifth group is composed of International NGOs - that is, NGOs not headquartered in 
the country for which they are respondents. Finally, our sixth group is made up of Donor 
Agencies, whether international organizations or the development agencies of donor 
governments.   A summary of our continuously valued variables is presented in Table 1 and a 
correlation matrix in Table 2.
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Variable type Variable name Mean St Dev Max Description
Political 
Institutions
Democracy 3.73 5.62 9 Mean Polity IV country score, 2008-
2012 (H1)
Politico- 
economic 
conditions
Primary Capital 0 1 1.78 Dollar value of fixed primary capital 
formation per US$ 1 billion of GDP, 
scaled in standard deviations (H2)
Market 0.102 0.133 0.667 Proportion of times organization 
reported Much or Very Much 
effort in REDD+ carbon offsetting 
activities (H3)
Community 0.286 0.216 1 Proportion of times organization 
reported Much or Very Much 
effort in community development 
activities (H4)
Policy Core 
Beliefs
Policy & 
Research
0.393 0.366 1 Proportion of times organization 
report Much or Very Much effort 
in designing subnational or national 
policy or scientific research (H5)
Control
GDP Per Capita 6462 4182 14281 Gross domestic product per capita 
(Control)
Table 1: Continuously valued variables used in model estimation.
Democracy GDP
  Per Capita
 Primary 
Capital
Market Community
GDP Per Capita 0.577
Primary Capital -0.618 -0.894
Market 0.0229 0.0480 0.0229
Community -0.0136 0.0480 -0.0136 -0.112
Policy & Research 0.0664 0.0447 0.0664 0.447 -0.0633
Table 2: Correlation matrix of continuously valued variables used in latent cluster regression 
model estimation.
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3.3. Methods for interpreting clusters
To aid interpretation of our latent class models, we conducted some additional analysis using the 
clusters determined by our optimal latent class model. We visualized differences in 
organizational responses by cluster on both the fitted and the cross-validation opinion statements. 
Also, we computed difference of proportions tests comparing the proportion of agreement with 
each item between our primary clusters, using 10,000 random permutations of the cluster 
assignments to test for statistical significance, using a Bonferroni correction (Dunn, 1961). We 
also utilize a measure of reputational power (Krackhardt, 1990; Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970) to 
compare the relative influence of the discursive orientations (clusters) we identify across the 
countries surveyed. We measure reputational power by taking the sum of all respondent 
organizations listing a given organization as particularly influential on REDD+ policy in 
[country] in our survey. For comparability, we divide scores by the total number of 
organizations interviewed in each country.
4. Results
4.1. Identifying meta-discourses
The estimated latent class regression models are presented in Tables 3 and B.1. Based on lowest 
BIC, we find that a three cluster solution is the most appropriate. While we estimate multiple 
models due to concerns about multicollinearity, membership in the three clusters is quite stable 
across models. To aid in interpretation of the estimated clusters, we present agreement on all 35 
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opinion statements, by clusters estimated by Model 3, our preferred model, in Figure 1. We find 
a cluster of about 8% of the 428 organizational respondents that have low response rates across 
the opinion statements (see Figure B.1 in Appendix B for detailed responses from this group). 
We call this the No Comment cluster. Notably, private sector actors seem to be much more 
likely to show up in this cluster, as are organizations active in less democratic countries, 
suggesting that a combination of strategic interests and political constraints may be making these 
organizations too risk-averse to take stances on many of our opinion items, even confidentially 
(Figure B.2). In qualitative interviews conducted along with the survey, many of these actors 
expressed low confidence in their expertise on REDD+, suggesting they may be marginal. One 
notable exception, however, were some governmental agencies, in particular Vietnam, who did 
not want to expresses or commit to a particular position on REDD+. Given that these 
organizations responses give us little information about their position, we focus on the two main 
clusters (accounting for about 92% of respondents) in our interpretation.
The two other clusters we identify have statistically significant and substantively important 
differences across the opinion statements, though their points of agreement are equally telling. 
Figure 3 and Table 3 highlight opinion statements where the two groups responses are 
statistically significantly different. The first of the two groups, accounting for about 59% of the 
sample, is more optimistic about the potential for REDD+ to effectively reduce emissions at a 
low cost while simultaneously improving livelihoods and forest governance. In keeping with the 
discussion of prevailing international discourses on forest policy above (Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand, 2006), we identify the statements in the cluster as reflecting Ecological Modernization 
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impacts on forests, climate change, and poverty, its members concerned with fairness and the 
risk of conflict. In interviews, many of these organizations were openly sceptical about the role 
of markets in forest carbon policy, an important distinction separating these positions statements 
from Ecological Modernization discourse. Also based on the discussion of global discourses 
outlined above, we identify these clusters of positions statements as representing as 
predominantly Civic Environmentalism discourse.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3: Percentage agreement with opinions statements, by cluster (see Table A.1. in Appendix 
A for the full description of the 25 opinion statements). Bolded entries indicate stances with 
statistically significant differences between Ecological Modernization and Civic 
Environmentalism Groups, based on 10,000 permutations of group assignments, with a 
Bonferroni correction. Created using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
Overall 
Percentage 
Agree/Strongly 
Agree
Opinion Statements  Label in Figure 1
77% REDD+ is an effective option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
globally
01 - Effective
77% REDD+ schemes will provide incentives and resources to improve 
forest governance (e.g. illegal logging and rule of law)
16 - Improve forest 
governance
73% REDD+ schemes are also likely to help countries to cope or adapt to 
the impacts of climate change
31 - Adaptation 
benefits
58% REDD+ is a financially affordable way to mitigate climate change 02 - Affordable
57% REDD+ schemes will be an important resource to reduce poverty 14 - Reduced 
poverty
38% REDD schemes will exacerbate conflicts about forest land and forest 
resources
10 - Exacerbate 
conflict
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32% REDD+ will assure fairness in the international distribution of 
environmental costs and benefits
03 - Fair
Table 3: Full description and level of agreement of opinion statements with statistically 
significant differences between Ecological Modernization and Civic Environmentalism groups. 
Statement numbers correspond to statement numbers in Figure 1.
These findings suggest that organizations opinions draw on environmental meta-discourses to 
frame REDD+. However, we find no cluster that can be equated with the green governmentality 
discourse. This could result from the survey design, which included few opinion statements on 
science and REDD+. Also, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) argue that reflexive forms of Green 
Governmentality overlap with Civic Environmentalism discourse, while more elitist technocratic 
forms overlap with weak Ecological Modernization positions, so Green Governmentality 
adherents may have been classified into one of these two other discourse clusters. On the other 
hand, previous media-based research on national REDD+ discourses found Green 
Governmentality to be a minority discourse observed only in one tenth of opinions expressed in 
the media in seven of the eight countries investigated in this paper (Di Gregorio et al., 2015). It 
may be that despite REDD+ being considered a technical issue, green governmentality 
discourses are not, in practice, a focal point for national level REDD+ policy discussions in the 
way they are studied here.
The points of agreement between the two main groups are as telling as their differences. There is 
generally consensus on the range of problems facing REDD+ across countries, for example. 
What distinguishes the Ecological Modernization and Civic Environmentalism groups is less 
their perception of what the problem is, such as land-use planning or governmental capacity, but, 
rather, the degree to which they are optimistic that governance reforms and market-oriented 
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approaches are adequate responses, with Civic Environmentalism being much more sceptical 
about the potential of REDD+ to deliver effectiveness and equity.
4.2. Modelling the adoption of meta-discourses
We estimate a number of different latent class regression models. Due to concerns of 
multicollinearity between GDP Per Capita, Primary Capital, and Democracy variables (see Table 
2), we estimate a number of models including GDP Per Capita, Primary Capital, and Democracy 
separately, as well as full models with and without fixed effects by country. We find that models 
with fixed effects, such as Model 1, perform poorly on BIC related to models without fixed 
effects for all specifications and therefore only report the full fixed effects model (Table 4). 
Finally, we estimate a model with both Primary Capital and GDP Per Capita as a way of 
checking that the Capital variable is not just proxying for the level of economic development. 
While Primary Capital and Democracy have their expected sign and significance on their own, 
they are too highly correlated for their effects to be distinguished clearly. Democracy, for 
example, is not statistically significant when included in a model with GDP Per Capita (not 
shown), but, as seen in Model 6, Primary Capital continues to have a statistically significant, 
negative effect even when controlling for GDP Per Capita, which it outperforms. The model with 
the lowest BIC, Model 3, includes the Democracy variable alone. As it is both our best balance 
of fit and parsimony and avoids multicollinearity with GDP Per Capita, we focus on it in our 
interpretation, referring to the other models as necessary. To aid interpretation, we provide predicted 
probability plots for continuous variables based on the coefficients estimated in Model 3 in Figure 4 and 
predicted probability changes based on organization type in Table B.4 in Appendix B.
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.499***
(0.146)
2.98
(4.26)
-2.18***
(0.538)
-1.86***
(0.480)
-6.10**
(2.31)
2.97
(4.29)
Community 2.13**
(0.820)
2.30**
(0.731)
2.19**
(0.726)
2.19**
(0.719)
2.08**
(0.712)
2.24**
(0.729)
Market -4.16*
(1.80)
-2.98*
(1.51)
-3.45*
(1.52)
-3.16*
(1.49)
-3.51*
(1.49)
-2.91
(1.50)
Policy & Research 0.763
(0.587)
0.478
(0.491)
0.420
(0.486)
0.485
(0.484)
0.470
(0.477)
0.529
(0.490)
Democracy 0.552***
(0.0580)
0.0508
(0.0441)
0.0872*
(0.0350)
Primary Capital 0.665*
(0.307)
-0.716
(0.377)
-0.497**
(0.180)
-0.888*
(0.373)
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.786***
(0.0844)
-0.593
(0.505)
0.503*
(0.249)
-0.564
(0.503)
Research/ Academic 1.59*
(0.808)
1.18
(0.613)
1.21*
(0.610)
1.11
(0.607)
1.12
(0.600)
1.06
(0.611)
Domestic NGO 1.61**
(0.535)
1.55***
(0.457)
1.55***
(0.465)
1.56***
(0.454)
1.57***
(0.455)
1.52***
(0.450)
Private Sector 0.454
(0.658)
0.613
(0.680)
0.649
(0.655)
0.640
(0.659)
0.678
(0.647)
0.558
(0.682)
International NGO 0.450
(0.658)
-1.94
(2.78)
0.237
(0.597)
0.230
(0.588)
0.270
(0.585)
0.0968
(0.590)
Donor Agency 0.606
(0.622)
0.485
(0.593)
0.490
(0.587)
0.490
(0.576)
0.488
(0.590)
0.385
(0.583)
Country Fixed Effects Yes No No No No No
N 428 428 428 428 428 428
BIC 9149 9116 9102 9105 9117 9113
Table 4: Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, Civic Environmentalism 
versus Ecological Modernization. See Appendix B Table B.1 for No Comment versus Ecological 
Modernization results. P-value of likelihood-ratio test against an intercept-only model with three 
clusters = 0.000. * = sig. at 0.05, ** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
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[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for continuous variables using coefficients estimated in Model 
3. Organization type set to Government, all other variables set at their means. Plots show the 
probability that an organization adopts each of the three discourses as the value of the 
independent variables change. Variables are plotted across their complete range in the data. 
Created with ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
National political institutions appear to have statistically and substantively significant 
relationships with the adoption of particular discursive strategies, but it is difficult to distinguish 
these relationships from one another and the effects of economic development more broadly. On 
their own, Democracy is positively and Primary Capital negatively associated with the adoption 
of Civic Environmentalism discourses (H1, H2). However, while Primary Capital retains its sign 
and significance when controlling for GDP Per Capita, this is not the case for Democracy, which, 
while still positive, is no longer statistically significant (p = 0.112) in a model without fixed 
effects and excluding only Primary Capital (not shown). However, both Democracy and Primary 
Capital outperform GDP Per Capita in explanatory power, based on lowest BIC, suggesting that 
institutional conditions, rather than the overall level of economic development, are more closely 
associated with organizations discursive practices.
With regards to core policy beliefs, we find that specialization in carbon offsetting decreases the 
probability that an organization will adopt Civic Environmentalism discourses (H3) across all 
models except Model 6, where the coefficient is not significant (p = 0.053), while specialization 
in community development activities is positively associated increases the probability across all 
models (H4). We do not, however, find any statistically significant effects of Policy & Research 
variable on the propensity to adopt Civic Environmentalism discourses. This could be in part 
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because of the absence of a clear Green Governmentality discourse cluster, which we would 
expect to be most affected by these activities.
Controlling for type of organization shows that domestic NGOs and CSOs are more likely than 
state, donors, international NGOs, and private sector organizations to adopt Civic 
Environmentalism discourses, as, in several models, are Research and Academic organizations. 
It is telling that we find this effect for domestic NGOs and not international NGOs, which have 
been found to act more in concert with donor agencies in some REDD+ countries (Moeliono et 
al., 2014).
4.3. Reputational power across clusters
Figure 5 presents the distribution of reputational power for Ecological Modernization and Civic 
Environmentalism clusters across countries. Consistent with findings of prior studies of policy 
advocacy on REDD+ (Babon, et al., 2014; Korhonen-Kurki, et al., 2014; Di Gregorio et al. 
2015), we find that the Ecological Modernization cluster is not only more numerous than the 
Civic Environmentalism cluster, its adherents also tend to be recognized as more powerful. 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 5: Normalized reputational power, by cluster. Created using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in 
R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
5. Discussion 
While several studies have focused on the question of how discourse coalitions can affect policy 
outcomes (Bulkeley, 2000; den Besten, et al., 2014; Hajer, 1995), there are also important 
27
questions regarding the feedbacks between broader institutions, belief systems and discursive 
orientations (Schmidt, 2008). Taking advantage of a unique dataset, we have tested five 
hypotheses regarding organizations adoption of particular discourses in different national 
contexts. We find compelling evidence that organizations discursive practices are influenced by 
their shared beliefs and, at the same time, are constrained by the broader institutional context 
(Weible et al., 2009; Arts and Buizer, 2009; Di Gregorio, 2012). We show that while comparing 
the adoption of discourses across national contexts can be demanding in terms of resources, it is 
possible to combine these research efforts with broad multi-country studies like the one utilized 
here. Model-based cluster analysis can be helpful in identifying meta-discourses (Bhatia et al., 
2008).
Our findings indicate that not only do national level political institutions and politico-economic 
conditions impact organizations ability to affect policy change (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012), 
they also constrain the types of ideas that are circulated in discourse, in the first place (Foucault, 
1972; Smith 2008; North, 2005). Such path-dependencies place barriers in the way of the kind of 
transformations expected to be necessary for approaches like REDD+ to result in effective 
changes in environmental governance (Brockhaus et al., 2016). However, we are not fully able to 
distinguish the effects of the broader political economy and democratic institutions. 
Understanding the unique contributions of these two different forms of institutional context 
should be a consideration in case selection for future research in this area.
At the same time, shared belief systems represent key building blocks of broad discursive 
practices (Di Gregorio, 2012; Elgert, 2012; Forsyth, 2013). In particular, the divide between 
policy core beliefs that have a fundamentally positive outlook about REDD+ and prioritize 
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market-based solutions from those that prioritize community development objectives, non-
carbon benefits and highlight distributive concern, seem to have crystallized into distinct 
orientations in REDD+ discourse in numerous countries (Vijge at al. 2016). These shared policy 
core beliefs, while themselves impacted by institutional conditions, contribute to the formation 
and strength of policy coalitions, advocating distinct positions, some favouring business-as-usual 
others demanding transformative change (Babon et al. 2014). Overall, and consistent with 
previous research on climate and forests, we find that organizations engaged in REDD+ tend to 
adopt more conservative Ecological Modernization discourses, as compared to Civic 
Environmentalism perspectives (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Di Gregorio et al., 2015). 
6. Conclusion
This study has drawn on diverse neo-institutional traditions to explain the distribution of broad 
discursive practices in eight REDD+ countries. While these approaches have often been used in 
isolation, thinking of them as complementary approaches identifying processes operating at 
different levels provides a more holistic picture of REDD+ policy processes. On the one hand, 
rational-choice explanations of institutional path dependencies help us study broad, slow 
processes that provide the context in which organizations adopt discursive practices. Yet, 
discursive choices are also informed by shared beliefs systems, which facilitate or constrain the 
formation of much more fluid discourse coalitions. 
Most importantly from a policy perspective, this study underlines the dominance of simplistic 
win-win ecological modernization discourses and associated politico-economic challenges that 
REDD+ faces in reversing the drivers of deforestation within national contexts. This is not to say 
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that there is no possibility of such change. What these findings do suggest, however, is that 
transformations toward more democratic governance - whether through long-term policy 
learning, political contention or evolutionary changes - and the presence of substantive 
constituencies that value the protection of local rights and livelihoods, provide the necessary 
basis for reformist discourses to emerge and spread. At present, in national REDD+ domains 
Civic Environmentalism discourses remain minority discourses, both in terms of numbers and 
political influence. Yet, how these perspectives might evolve to overcome politico-economic 
path dependencies remains an important area for further research. Studying the role of coalition 
building, collaboration and normative change via long term discursive-institutional co-evolution 
will continue to be an important part of developing accounts of advocacy on global 
environmental concerns. 
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Appendix A on Methods
Numbering Opinion Statements Percentage 
Agree/ Strongly 
Agree
Use
1
REDD is an effective option for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions globally
77% Model
2
REDD is a financially affordable way to mitigate climate 
change
58% Model
3
REDD will assure fairness in the international distribution 
of environmental costs and benefits
32% Model
4 REDD schemes should only be financed through funds 28% Model
5
In the long-run REDD should be included in schemes to 
offset credits in compliance carbon markets
59% Model
6
In the post-Kyoto regime the definition of forest should 
exclude monocultures
43% Model
7
All REDD accounting and payments should go through the 
national governments
32% Model
8
REDD benefits should reward large-scale 
industries/companies for reducing forest emissions
42% Model
9
REDD should mainly reward local people for emission 
reduction activities
88% Cross 
Validation
10
REDD schemes will exacerbate conflicts about forest land 
and forest resources
38% Cross 
Validation
11
All REDD schemes aimed at reducing CO2 emissions 
should also require the realization of other key benefits like 
poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation
89% Model
12 Improved recognition of local tenure rights is a pre- 86% Cross 
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condition for effective and equitable implementation of 
REDD schemes
Validation
13
REDD schemes developed with the sole objectives to 
reduce CO2 emissions are likely to be in contrast with 
biodiversity conservation aims.
44% Cross 
Validation
14
REDD schemes will be an important resource to reduce 
poverty
57% Model
15
Without involvement of local people in their 
implementation, REDD projects are unlikely to be effective
87% Cross 
Validation
16
REDD schemes will provide incentives and resources to 
improve forest governance (e.g. illegal logging and rule of 
law)
77% Model
17
Strengthened governance is a pre-condition for successful 
REDD schemes
90% Model
18
REDD schemes will further weaken the limited 
administrative capacity of the state
14% Cross 
Validation
19
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . lack of knowledge and awareness on 
REDD by relevant stakeholders
88% Cross 
Validation
20
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . achieving effective coordination between 
state agencies, the private sector, and civil society
92% Model
21
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . the lack of technical expertise for 
monitoring carbon emissions and sequestration
73% Cross 
Validation
22
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . the delay in the clarification of tenure rights
82% Model
23
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . contradictions among laws and regulations 
in forestry, agriculture and other sectors
79% Model
24
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . social conflict and local resistance
56% Cross 
Validation
25
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . effectively addressing main drivers of 
79% Cross 
Validation
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deforestation without compromising development 
objectives
26
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . achieving broad consensus on changes in 
existing land use plans
83% Model
27
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . low capacity to enforce laws and 
regulations
81% Cross 
Validation
28
One of the main challenges for an effect REDD Strategy in 
[country] is . . . negotiating with powerful special interests 
influencing the main drivers of deforestation
70% Cross 
Validation
29
Scientific experts are the best and final authority on REDD 18% Cross 
Validation
30
Scientific experts dominate the national REDD policy 
discussion, at the expense of other relevant interests (e.g. 
business and civil society organizations)
34% Model
31
REDD schemes are also likely to help countries to cope or 
adapt to the impacts of climate change
73% Model
32
REDD schemes should always require permission from 
local forest resource users in the form of Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC)
77% Cross 
Validation
33
Forest conservation schemes, sustainable forest 
management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
should all be eligible for REDD
81% Model
34
REDD mechanisms are unlikely to be effective in reducing 
national level emissions because of difficulties in 
controlling leakage and in assuring the additionality and 
permanence
43% Cross 
Validation
35
A national approach (for reference levels, MRV, rewards 
etc.) is necessary to ensure effectiveness of REDD schemes 
(as compared to project-based approach)
66% Model
Table A.1: Opinion statements (stances) used in model fitting and cross validation. 15 statements 
were chosen as a compromise between providing a rigorous test of the model by providing more 
statements that can be used to assess the models validity, and providing sufficient numbers of 
statements for the model to fit. The statements chosen as cross-validation statements were 
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randomly selected by the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2015)
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Appendix B on Results 
[FIGURE B.1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure B.1: Percentage responses across all response categories, No Comment group. Created 
using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
Models excluding organizations based in Central Kalimantan are presented in Tables B.2 and 
B.3. We find only minor differences in coefficient sign and significance in comparison to the 
models with Central Kalimantan, with two exceptions. First, the Market variable, which has 
estimated p-values only slightly below 0.05 in the models with all observations, has a p-value 
slightly above 0.05 in some of the models without Central Kalimantan. The second difference is 
found in Model 4. In this model, a different set of clusters, which do not correspond well to the 
Civic Environmentalism/Ecological Modernization clustering found to be consistent across the 
other models is found. As this is not the lowest BIC model, and as the other models are 
consistent with one another and with the models including the observations from Central 
Kalimantan, we concentrate on the models including Central Kalimantan in the body of the 
paper.
[FIGURE B.2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure B.2: Discourse cluster distribution by organizational type and country. Created using 
ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -0.629 -10.0 -0.880 -1.15 6.00 -9.87
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(0.494) (12.9) (0.690) (0.711) (4.78) (12.7)
Community -0.657
(1.90)
-0.996
(1.60)
-0.600
(1.52)
-0.816
(1.29)
-0.695
(1.20)
-0.900
(1.35)
Market 0.959
(5.56)
-0.249
(5.19)
-0.204
(4.53)
-0.984
(4.30)
-1.14
(3.93)
-1.06
(4.55)
Policy & 
Research
-5.19
(4.46)
-4.43
(2.90)
-3.79
(2.95)
-4.61
(2.59)
-3.94
(2.57)
-5.01
(2.57)
Democracy 0.249*
(0.112)
-0.132
(0.0932)
-0.165
(0.0845)
Primary 
Capital
0.949
(1.03)
1.15
(1.08)
0.858*
(0.435)
1.47
(1.04)
GDP Per 
Capita (ln)
-0.339
(0.195)
1.06
(1.51)
-0.831
(0.570)
1.02
(1.48)
Research/ 
Academic
0.389
(1.93)
0.508
(1.41)
0.271
(1.44)
0.227
(1.26)
0.0692
(1.27)
0.494
(1.20)
Domestic 
NGO
-13.2***
(0.000)
-40.4***
(0.000)
-13.0***
(0.000)
-16.5***
(0.000)
-12.0***
(0.000)
-19.5***
(0.000)
Private 
Sector
2.35
(1.33)
2.48*
(1.16)
2.29*
(1.01)
2.20**
(0.776)
2.12**
(0.723)
2.29**
(0.856)
International 
NGO
-1.66
(2.74)
-1.47
(2.11)
-1.63
(2.16)
-1.55
(1.81)
-1.55
(1.77)
-1.49
(1.77)
Donor 
Agency
-2.02
(3.34)
-1.94
(2.78)
-1.85
(2.63)
-2.02
(2.52)
-1.71
(2.35)
-2.11
(2.42)
Country 
Fixed Effects
Yes No No No No No
N 428 428 428 428 428 428
BIC 9148 9115 9102 9101 9117 9113
Table B.1: Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, No Comment versus 
Ecological Modernization. * = sig. at 0.05, ** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
[FIGURE B.3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure B.3: ROC Curves and Area Under the Curve for Model 3. Plotted with pROC (Robins, et 
al., 2011) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.445**
(0.147)
3.14
(4.29)
-2.25***
(0.556)
0.422
(0.412)
-6.25**
(2.35)
3.04
(4.32)
Community 3.31***
(0.978)
2.72***
(0.842)
2.62**
(0.837)
-1.29
(0.764)
2.43**
(0.810)
2.58**
(0.830)
Market -3.74
(1.91)
-2.46
(1.52)
-3.07*
(1.54)
2.12
(1.30)
-3.18*
(1.50)
-2.41
(1.50)
Policy & 
Research
0.879
(0.616)
0.515
(0.489)
0.466
(0.484)
-0.373
(0.453)
0.512
(0.473)
0.548
(0.485)
Democracy 0.507***
(0.0594)
0.0555
(0.0434)
0.0917**
(0.0355)
Primary 
Capital
0.559
(0.315)
-0.764*
(0.387)
0.613***
(0.168)
-0.939*
(0.380)
GDP Per 
Capita (ln)
-0.801***
(0.0914)
-0.624
(0.507)
0.518*
(0.252)
-0.580
(0.506)
Research/ 
Academic
1.76
(0.926)
1.18
(0.627)
1.22
(0.623)
-0.974
(0.570)
1.08
(0.611)
1.03
(0.622)
Domestic 
NGO
1.81**
(0.596)
1.57***
(0.464)
1.58***
(0.471)
-0.996*
(0.422)
1.58***
(0.461)
1.54***
(0.457)
Private Sector 0.587
(1.21)
0.711
(0.707)
0.710
(0.693)
-0.370
(0.577)
0.789
(0.673)
0.689
(0.694)
International 
NGO
0.555
(0.741)
0.0188
(0.620)
0.0796
(0.612)
0.502
(0.502)
0.122
(0.596)
-0.0521
(0.605)
Donor Agency 0.756
(0.664)
0.450
(0.597)
0.471
(0.587)
0.202
(0.487)
0.452
(0.588)
0.335
(0.584)
Country 
Fixed Effects
Yes No No No No No
N 401 401 401 401 401 401
BIC 8589 8559 8547 8549 8563 8558
37
Table B.2: Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, Civic Environmentalism 
versus Ecological Modernization, without organizations based in Central Kalimantan. * = sig. at 
0.05, ** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -0.177
(0.416)
-9.73
(14.3)
-0.947
(0.733)
-0.816
(1.11)
5.96
(5.30)
-9.52
(13.2)
Community -0.932
(1.89)
-0.833
(1.70)
-0.431
(1.60)
-1.54
(2.57)
-0.488
(1.27)
-0.606
(1.39)
Market -2.11
(6.84)
-2.43
(6.33)
-2.19
(5.46)
-0.147
(5.92)
-3.12
(4.56)
-3.39
(5.34)
Policy & 
Research
-4.31
(3.37)
-4.36
(3.09)
-3.68
(3.27)
-5.62
(4.25)
-3.85
(2.88)
-4.90
(2.65)
Democracy -0.253*
(0.113)
-0.138
(0.0980)
-0.171
(0.0910)
Primary 
Capital
-0.388
(0.738)
1.21
(1.22)
1.75*
(0.819)
1.50
(1.09)
GDP Per 
Capita (ln)
-0.0728
(0.141)
1.02
(1.67)
-0.833
(0.630)
0.984
(1.54)
Research/ 
Academic
0.400
(1.56)
0.612
(1.43)
0.356
(1.47)
-1.54
(2.57)
0.145
(1.32)
0.590
(1.21)
Domestic 
NGO
-13.2***
(0.000)
-12.4***
(0.000)
-13.0
(0.000)
-17.4***
(0.000)
-12.3***
(0.000)
-12.8***
(0.000)
Private Sector 2.42
(1.43)
2.68
(1.31)
2.45*
(1.08)
1.73
(1.03)
2.27**
(0.790)
2.43*
(0.956)
International 
NGO
-1.68
(2.63)
-1.41
(2.31)
-1.58
(2.29)
-1.28
(2.53)
-1.49
(1.99)
-1.50
(1.92)
Donor Agency -2.05
(3.21)
-1.84
(2.97)
-1.73
(2.77)
-1.50
(1.44)
-1.58
(2.48)
-2.04
(2.51)
Country 
Fixed Effects
Yes No No No No No
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N 401 401 401 401 401 401
BIC 8589 8559 8547 8549 8563 8558
Table B.3: Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, No Comment versus 
Ecological Modernization, without organizations based in Central Kalimantan. * = sig. at 0.05, 
** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
Organization Type Ecological 
Modernization
Civic 
Environmentalism
No 
Comment
Government 0.798 0.140 0.062
Research/ 
Academic
0.590 0.350 0.0599
Domestic NGO 0.547 0.453 0.000
Private Sector 0.477 0.161 0.363
International NGO 0.808 0.180 0.0122
Donor Agency 0.770 0.221 0.00940
Table B.4: Predicted probabilities of cluster membership by organization type, based on Model 
3. All other variables set to their means.
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